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Resumen
A pesar  del mínimo crecimiento económico 
en los países de América Latina de 2006 en 
adelante, mucho de ellos han acumulado re-
servas internaciones. En la literatura se pueden 
encontrar tres causas por las cuales se acumulan 
reservas: (1) el pago de la deuda a corto plazo, 
(2) el pago de por lo menos tres meses de im-
portaciones, y (3) la protección de una even-
tual salida de capitales y problemas en el tipo 
de cambio. No obstante, la mayoría de los paí-
ses de América Latina cumple los tres criterios. 
¿Por qué entonces algunos países latinoame-
ricanos siguen acumulando reservas? Nuestra 
respuesta es que para algunos gobiernos, el ate-
soramiento podría representar una expresión 
social de la riqueza en el corto plazo, distinción 
que hizo Marx para economías no considera-
das capitalistas.
Abstract
Even though several Latin American coun-
tries have shown recently poor economic 
performance, many of them have accumu-
lated foreign exchange reserves from 2006 
onwards. Conventionally, three reasons are 
given for international reserves accumula-
tion: (1) payment of short-term debt, (2) 
payment of at least three months of im-
ports, and (3) protection for an outﬂow of 
capital. However, the majority of the Latin 
American countries meet all three criteria. 
Why then do some Latin American coun-
tries continue to accumulate reserves? Our 
answer is that for some governments, hoard-
ing might represent a social expression of 
wealth, following Marx's ideas
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Introduction
Even though several Latin American countries have shown recently poor 
economic performance, many of them have accumulated foreign exchange 
reserves from 2006 onwards. Conventionally, three reasons are given for in-
ternational reserves accumulation: (1) payment of short-term debt, (2) pay-
ment of at least three months of imports, and (3) protection for an outﬂow 
of capital. However, the majority of the Latin American countries meet all 
three criteria. Why then do some Latin American countries continue to ac-
cumulate reserves? Our answer is that for some governments, hoarding might 
represent a social expression of wealth, following Marx's ideas. After this in-
troduction, Section 2 describes the economic performance of Latin America, 
the US, Germany, and Japan. In Section 3, we highlight the increasing amount 
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in reserves as percent of GDP in Latin America and some developed countries. 
Section 4 advances a theoretical explanation for accumulating foreign ex-
change reserves. In Section 5, we present concluding remarks.
Economic growth performance
In 2007, the deepest world crisis since the Great Depression started and has 
continued with neither a theoretical nor a practical solution to date. However, 
in contrast to the 1980s and 1990s, the crisis was precipitated by advanced cou-
ntries— not poor countries. Analyzing economic growth during the period of 
neoliberalism, the following patterns can be distinguished (see Table 1):
(1) Latin America lost decade from 1981 to 1990 after debt crises; growth 
rates were on average 1.4 percent. Never has the area undergone a period of 
stagnation of that magnitude after WWII. From 1991 to 1995, Latin America 
experienced a recovery, due to implementation of neoliberal policies. Howe-
ver, after a short-term boom, economies plummeted for nearly a decade, from 
1996 to 2005. During this time, the growth rate averaged 2.8 percent. In spite 
of a sharp decline of gdp in 2009 in the region, from 2006 onwards the area 
has grown, with disparities, 3.5 percent.
(2) The performance of advanced countries during the 1980s was far bet-
ter than that of Latin American countries. However, from 1991 onwards, 
advanced economies, especially Germany and Japan, slowed drastically. Ger-
many from 2001 onwards has grown 1.1 percent and Japan 0.87 percent. The 
us has seen 1.78 percent growth. Even though the us performance has been 
better than that of Europe and Japan, 1.78 percent was the worst performance 
under neoliberalism.1
(3) Latin America is growing faster than the us as an area in the last 9 years. 
However, Table 1 shows that Brazil and Mexico have grown at a very slow 
rate. Brazil and Mexico have, historically, accounted for around 70 percent 
of Latin America’s GDP, so the recent slow rate of growth is not good news. 
(4) In 1980, A. Lewis (1980) proposed that the engine of growth for under-
developed countries was trade. As long as advanced economies underwent ex-
pansion, underdeveloped economies could grow at a high level. Also, as long as 
the majority of the Latin American countries had weak domestic markets, the 
1 Roberts (2009) notes two trends under neoliberalism in the US economy. First, from 1982 to 1997, 
proﬁt rate increased, and then growth rate was 3.5 percent. Second, from 1998 to present day, proﬁt 
rate has declined, and then growth rate was 2.6 percent. At the moment, the US would be at the 
bottom of the crisis.
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only option to grow would be to increase interregional cooperation through 
trade in underdeveloped countries. 
(5) Neoliberalism, has fueled the shift in Latin American economies to 
attempt to increase exports (Williamson 1990), mainly commodities. Do-
mestic markets have not gotten wider, real wages have not increased, income 
distribution has not improved, and interregional cooperation among under-
developed countries has not succeeded. It would seem that economic growth 
in Latin America depends on external factors. However, Latin American GDP 
in several countries has been stagnant.
(6) Finally, China has grown consistently from 1981 onwards.
Table 1
Growth in Countries around the World
Countries 1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2013
Argentina -1.4 6.7 2.7 2.4 5.7 4.1
Brazil 1.6 3.1 2.0 2.8 4.5 2.1
Colombia 3.6 4.1 1.3 3.6 4.6 5.1
Chile 3.9 8.7 4.2 4.2 3.5 5.1
Mexico 1.9 2.2 5.1 1.7 2.0 3.0
Peru -0.7 5.3 2.6 4.3 6.9 6.1
Uruguay 0.2 4.0 3.0 0.3 5.7 5.1
Venezuela 0.9 3.5 0.8 3.1 3.8 3.7
Latin America 1.4 3.4 3.1 2.5 3.8 3.2
US 3.4 2.6 4.3 2.5 0.8 2.0
Germany 2.3 2.0 1.9 0.6 1.3 1.4
Japan 4.6 1.4 0.9 1.2 0.4 1.0
Adv. Countries 3.5 2.2 3.1 1.9 0.8 1.7
China 9.3 12.3 8.6 9.8 11.2 8.2
Source: World Bank
Foreign exchange reserve accumulation
From 2008 through 2009, several countries had abrupt declines in gdp, along 
with problems in other economic variables such as unemployment, current 
account deﬁcits, and the evolution of the proﬁt rate.  In 2008, the us gdp de-
clined -0.3 percent, and Japan saw a decline of -1.0 percent. Meanwhile, in 
2009, the growth rate in Germany was -5.6 percent,   -in Japan -5.5 percent, 
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in the us -2.8 percent, and in Brazil -0.3 percent. The deepest crisis in Latin 
America occurred in Mexico, which had a growth rate of -4.7 percent (and 
one of the worst performances in the region). It is evident that developed as 
well as underdeveloped countries suffered after 2007. Some scholars such as 
Wolf (2004), Collier and Dollar (2002), Bernake (2004), and Cotis (2007) 
(quoted in Keen 2011) have pointed out that globalization    has beneﬁted de-
veloped countries only, but this argument is now challenged with the current 
economic crisis because the economies of the US2 and the majority of the Eu-
ropean countries have stagnated and are characterized by high unemployment 
and blatant inequality.
However, a worldwide phenomenon that has garnered attention is the in-
creasing foreign exchange reserves in underdeveloped countries, concomitant 
to the low level of reserves in the majority of advanced countries. From 1981 
to 2000, foreign exchange reserves in Latin America as a percent of GDP were 
around 5.9 to 7.7 percent. Since 2006 foreign exchange reserves have almost 
doubled as a percent of GDP, the most signiﬁcant cases being Brazil, Mexico, 
and Peru (See Table 2).
Table 2
Foreign Exchange Reserves as Percent of GDP
Countries 1981-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2013
Argentina 5.0 5.1 6.8 9.1 12.3 6.8
Brazil 2.9 5.8 5.9 7.4 12.2 15.6
Colombia 11.0 13.2 9.4 11.0 10.0 10.3
Chile 15.4 22.1 20.5 18.3 12.5 15.7
Mexico 3.8 4.4 5.6 7.6 9.5 13.7
Peru 10.6 12.8 18.8 18.1 26.0 31.5
Uruguay 20.3 9.5 10.2 14.8 20.1 26.1
Venezuela 19.9 22.3 17.8 17.8 13.2 7.0
Latin America 5.9 7.1 7.7 9.2 11.9 13.9
US 3.4 2.4 1.6 1.4 2.3 3.3
Germany 9.2 5.3 4.6 3.9 4.6 6.2
Japan 3.0 2.6 6.0 14.8 21 23
Adv. Countries 6.4 2.9 3.2 4.9 6.6 8.0
China 7.2 9.2 14.5 26.3 45.2 42.6
Source: World Bank
2 The US has suffered less.
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A theoretical explanation
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile, Uruguay, and Peru have increased their 
foreign exchange reserves as a percent of GDP from 2006 onwards, but Brazil 
and Mexico have produced minimal economic growth. With the hoarding 
carried out by Latin American countries, these  countries have bought T-bills 
and other ﬁnancial assets, resulting in a situation in which underdeveloped 
countries might ﬁnance developed ones, particularly  the US. In 2012, among 
the biggest buyers of  T-bills worldwide, Brazil was number 5, Mexico was 
number 14, and Colombia and Chile were numbers 28 and 30, respectively 
(see Figure 1). Beginning in 2005, all four countries have increased their pur-
chases of treasury bonds. Why have some countries of Latin America pursued 
a policy of international reserves accumulation with a minimal growth rate?
Figure 1
Latin America's T-Bills accumulation as a percent of GDP
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The economic literature conventionally identiﬁes three reasons countries 
hoard (See Bird and Rajan 2003; Rodrik 2006; Lanteri 2014). The ﬁrst is to 
ensure payment of short-term debt (usually one year), which is the so-called 
Guidotti-Greenspan rule.  As shown in Figure 2, all Latin American coun-
tries, except Argentina, have reduced their short-term debt level with respect 
to their foreign exchange reserve from the late 1990s to the present day. This 
fact, according to Rodrik (2014), helps countries to borrow more easily and 
avert a crisis.
Figure 2
Ratio of short-debt to foreign exchange reserves
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A second reason for international reserves accumulation takes into account 
each country’s participation in international trade. Payment of three months 
of imports is considered an appropriate level (Rodrik 2006; Bird and Rajan 
2003). According to Rodrik (2006), this ratio had ﬂuctuated around 3 during 
the 1990s in almost all the underdeveloped countries.  Currently, countries 
such as Brazil, Peru, and Uruguay have ratios higher than 10.  Colombia, 
Mexico, and Chile have ratios between 3 and 4, and in Argentina and Vene-
zuela the ratio has deteriorated but is still above the level that is considered 
appropriate (See Table 3).
Table 3
Ratio of Foreign Exchange Reserves to Imports
Countries 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Argentina 7.3 7.3 8.4 6.9 9.3 7.6 5.3 5.3
Brazil 5.1 6.7 10.9 8.5 13.2 11.9 11.7 12.8
Chile 4 3.5 2.6 3.1 4.4 3.6 4.6 4.5
Colombia 5.7 4.9 5.3 5 6.1 5.6 4.8 5.1
Mexico 3.3 3 3.1 3.1 4.3 4.1 4.4 4.6
Peru 8.2 7.9 9.9 8.4 11.3 11.0 10.2 12.5
Uruguay 6.4 5.3 6 6.4 9.9 7.6 8.3 10
Venezuela 9.9 9 6.2 7.1 6.9 5.9 4.7 3.9
Source: Authors' elaboration with data from World Bank 2014
A further indicator aims at the ﬁnancial sector with regard to the ratio of M2 
to foreign exchange reserves; the rule of thumb is considered to be 5. The 
indicator shows whether countries could solve sudden capital outﬂows and 
subsequent problems in exchange rate. Then, this argument would be the re-
ason for the outstanding accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in under-
developed countries. However, no country in Latin America (except Chile 
and Venezuela for short periods of time) has exceeded that level on average in 
the 2000s (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 3
Ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves. Dotted line = 5
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Why do Brazil and Mexico, especially, keep up a policy of accumulation of 
foreign exchange accumulation? According to Aizeman and Lee (2006), ac-
cumulation of foreign exchange is a neomercantilist policy that was practiced 
in Japan and Korea. Two types of neomercantilism are distinguished: (1) mo-
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netary mercantilism and (2) ﬁnancial mercantilism. The ﬁrst is compounded 
on competitive depreciations among underdeveloped countries, which pro-
duces an economic policy beggar-thy-neighbor with negative externalities 
for other countries. The second is based on supporting export sectors incre-
asing their productivity. The two measures seek a positive trade balance, to 
hoard and promote economic growth. However, except for Chile, Peru, and 
Venezuela, no country in Latin America has had persistent trade surpluses and 
none of them has had persistent economic growth. It is well known that Latin 
American countries beneﬁted from the early 2000’s boom in commodities. 
Neither trade surpluses during that period because of competitive deprecia-
tions, nor increases in neither productivity, nor hoarding were used to spark 
an industrialization process.
As already mentioned, Rodrik (2006) provides an explanation called self-
insurance protection against the capital outﬂows or changes in the exchange 
rate that may lead to a crisis. He also notes two types of costs involved in 
hoarding international reserves: (1) the spread between “the private sector’s 
cost of short-term borrowing abroad and the yield that the Central Bank 
earns on its liquid foreign assets” (Rodrik 2006, 7) such as T-bills; and (2) 
the loss of buying T-bills instead of increasing the stock of capital or social 
spending (antipoverty programs). 
Some post-Keynesian scholars argue in the same vein considering the last 
point: As long as international reserves go beyond 5 or 6 percent of GDP, 
the surplus can be used to increase the stock of capital (Cruz 2006). Post-
Keynesian scholars also comment that capital controls and not the increase of 
foreign exchange reserve prevent outﬂow of capital and exchange rate pro-
blems (Grabel 2003; Cruz 2006). Of course, increases in the stock of capital 
as well as capital controls may be desirable, but this position neglects the fact 
that institutions in each underdeveloped country are embedded, and that to 
establish capital controls in all the countries as in the Golden Age is not pos-
sible right now, given the correlation of forces among the elite and between 
the elite and working class. Also, post-Keynesian scholars forget the evolution 
of the proﬁt rate.
Some Marxists (Lapavitsas 2013; Labrinidis 2014) notes that accumulation 
of foreign exchange is due to the function of money as world money. Certain 
currencies, therefore, go beyond their national space and serve as an interna-
tional means of payment and hoarding. Advanced countries with quasi-world 
money, such as the US, Germany, and Japan have to keep a certain amount of 
foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile, underdeveloped countries that intend 
12
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to have quasi-world money have to hoard vast amounts of foreign exchange 
reserves. Labrinidis (2014) and Persaud (2004) point out that China is the lea-
ding candidate to have quasi-world money in the future. That this argument 
may be valid for China, but not for Brazil and other Latin American coun-
tries, makes sense, because there are other economic and institutional factors 
that might inﬂuence whether a currency is quasi- world money (Lapavitsas 
2006). Among these factors are economic growth and an army.  However, 
the function of hoarding can give each country the appearance of strength. 
As Marx notes (1946; 1980), hoarding damages the industrial capitalist and 
leads an economy towards deﬂation, but in some ancient societies hoarding 
was the expression of social wealth. Hoarding, then, may also represent power 
and give weak countries the appearance of strength.
Conclusion
This article has described the economic performance of Latin America, the 
US, Germany, and Japan. We found that Latin American countries have grown 
at a higher rate than some developed countries, but underdeveloped countries 
have grown through trade, so they needed more than the advanced countries, 
rather than vice versa. We highlighted the increasing amount in reserves as 
percent of GDP, especially in Brazil, Mexico, and, Peru, and noted that for 
some countries, reserves might represent the social expression of wealth and 
not capacity production. 
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